Can the body be more than an automaton to be fixed? Encounters between Spinoza’s philosophy and the Bobath concept
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/2526-8910.ctoARF269335121Keywords:
Occupational Therapy, Higher Education, Human Body, Rehabilitation, Neurological RehabilitationAbstract
This essay reflects on the teaching of the Bobath concept to occupational therapy undergraduate students at the College of Medicine of the University of São Paulo (FMUSP) considering the premises of Spinoza’s philosophy, which understands the body as relational, and its interrelationships with occupational-therapeutic interventions. Spinoza’s philosophy is used as a tool to critically analyze the experiences of teaching the Bobath concept discussed in the essay. Aspects related to the body—understood as a machine, mechanic, organic, among other adjectives, as advocated by the Cartesian assumptions, which underlie modern biomedical practices in the field of health and other areas—are analyzed. Next, the concept of relational body in Spinoza’s philosophy is presented in its interrelations with occupational therapy practice as an alternative to the biomedical model. To this end, it is necessary to consider the concept of desire, which does not refer to absence, but to presence, as proposed by Spinoza, who recalls that desire is the origin of action in relation to other bodies. Finally, the experience of teaching the Bobath concept under Spinoza’s perspective is analyzed. Classes that address such content are practical, without notes, dialogued, with body experiments and simulations, and procedures are taught. Body memory is prioritized in the teaching-learning process. The limits of all body techniques, which are just resources, not the totality of occupational-therapeutic interventions, are pointed out. The Bobath concept should be taught and democratized so that it can be widely used in different public health services.
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